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I. INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. '
If the eye of television had thrown open the doors of the First Congress and
publicly broadcast the debates over the Bill of Rights, who knows what sort of
influence television would have had in both the wording of the First Amendment,
and on the actions of its drafters.
But television was not there, nor even envisioned, and as a result, the problem
of applying the First Amendment to the broadcast media has fallen largely on the
modern legislature and the courts.2
One aspect of regulating television that required the utmost care was the
regulation of political speech. To be certain, the increasing role that television
plays in the lives of the average citizen makes it one of the most influential tools
in disseminating political ideas.'
47 U.S.C. § 315, which grew out of the Communications Act of 1934, requires
that equal opportunities be made available to political candidates to have access to
the airwaves.4 However, as with any scarce resource, this has presented practical
concerns because primary elections can result in as many as thirty candidates vying
for the same office.'
The Supreme Court struggled with the opposing aims of protecting political
speech and regulating a scarce resource when the Court presided over the case of
I. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
2. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT I I
(University of California Press) (1987).
3. See Governor's Race Puts Big Money' in TV Ads, Advisers Say It's Best Way to Reach Voters,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 1997, at B I; Kevin Gaughan, Until We Curb TV's Power,
Political Influence Will Be Bought And Sold In the Marketplace, BUFFALO NEWS, April 16, 1997, at
B2.
4. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
5. See WAYNE OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 368 (Harcourt Brace College
Publishers 1996) (1982).
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Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes.6 In its six-to-three
decision, the Court held that a government-owned public television station was not
precluded by the First Amendment from denying a third-party candidate access to
its televised political debate.7
This note will examine the Court's decision in Forbes and discuss its
implications for future First Amendment and 47 U.S.C. § 315 cases involving
political speech. Part II discusses the historical background of cases and statutory
law concerning both public access to television under the First Amendment and the
permissible regulation of free speech under the First Amendment.8 Part III
discusses the facts and procedural history of Forbes.9 This prefaces the discussion
in Part IV in which the majority and dissenting opinions will be summarized and
analyzed.' ° Part V will be a critical projection of immediate and future trends in
the First Amendment's application to broadcasting." Part VI of this note will
briefly summarize the material.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Communications Act of 1934: Congress Defines the Role of
Broadcast Media
Prior to 1934, Radio was regulated by two pieces of legislation, the Wireless
Ship Act of 1910 and the Radio Act of 1912.2 They were both woefully
inadequate because neither had been drafted at a time when broadcasting was
perceived as a commercial endeavor.' 3 The Wireless Ship Act was a safety
measure to ensure that ships had proper radio equipment in case of emergency.4
The Radio Act was an attempt to fulfill international treaty obligations, and
required licensing of stations by the Commerce Department, but did not require the
assigning of broadcast frequencies."'
In 1920, under the auspices of the Radio Act, Westinghouse Electric and
Manufacturing Company applied for and was granted a license for a shore station
in Pittsburgh. 6 KDKA came into existence and was put on the air not to
6. 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) (hereinafter Forbes).
7. See id. at 1644.
8. See infra notes 12-139 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 140-68 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 169-252 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 253-86 and accompanying text.
12. See POWE, supra note 2, at 54.
13. See OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 347.
14. See POWE, supra note 2, at 54.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 53.
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communicate with ships, but to promote Westinghouse products. 7 By 1922,
approximately 576 commercial stations were on the air, 8 and they were literally
drowning one another out.' 9 Over the ensuing years, the problem of signal
interference got worse.2" "Like modem [Citizens' Band radio], the AM band then
had layer upon layer of signals, with the louder ones covering up weaker ones and
with signals suddenly disappearing and showing up elsewhere on the dial.'
After a series of industry conferences aimed at self-regulation failed, existing
broadcasters asked then Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover to impose order.-
Hoover attempted to do so despite a D.C. Circuit Court ruling23 that the Radio Act
of 1912 did not confer such power upon him.24 Hoover reorganized the radio
spectrum and assigned frequencies and hours of operation.2 ' New broadcasters
coming on the air refused to adhere to Hoover's decisions,26 and his authority was
again undermined in United States v. Zenith Radio Corp. 27 The Zenith court held
that the Radio Act did not give Hoover the authority to impose restrictions on the
transmission power, broadcast frequency, or hours of operation of a station. 8
Realizing that new legislation was needed, Congress passed the Radio Act of
1927.29 It established a new regulatory agency under the Commerce Department,
the Federal Radio Commission.3" The Commission's job was to assign broadcast
frequencies through licensing and create an orderly system of stations such that
stations' signals did not interfere with one another.3' Also, the legislation
recognized the airwaves as a public resource. As a result, licensing under the Act
was to be done so that the "public interest, convenience, or necessity will be
served."33
Licenses could be, and were, denied if the Commission felt that the public
17. See id.
18. See id. at 54.
19. See id. at 59 (for example, two Cincinnati radio stations, unable to reach an agreement on
allocating the same frequency, simultaneously broadcast on it for weeks on end).
20. See id. at 58-60.
21. OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 348.
22. See POWE, supra note 2, at 58.
23. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24. See POWE, supra note 2, at 58.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 59.
27. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. III. 1926).
28. See POWE, supra note 2, at 59-60.
29. See OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 348.
30. See id.
31. See POWE, supra note 2, at 63.
32. See id. at 61.
33. See id.
interest was not being served by the broadcaster.34 The public ownership of the
airwaves was further reinforced by the licensing period. Licenses were issued for
only three years, and then, if not renewed, the licensed frequency reverted back to
the public for reissue."
Under Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, the Radio Act of 1927 was replaced
with the Communications Act of 1934.36 While similar in form and substance to
the 1927 Act,37 it had a few important differences. The Federal Radio Commission
now became the Federal Communications Commission, and was funded separately
from the Commerce Department.38 Congress also reiterated that the airwaves were
owned and to be licensed and operated for the benefit of the public.39 Additionally,
Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 315, allowing for equal opportunity for political
candidates to have access to broadcasting facilities, as a means of furthering the
goal of serving the public interest.4 °
Section 315 was amended in 1959 to except newscasts, news interviews,
documentaries, and on-the-spot news reports from the equal opportunity require-
ment.a" In 1960, Congress suspended the equal time provision to allow the
broadcasting of the Great Debates between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy. 2
Suspending the provision allowed Nixon and Kennedy to debate while excluding
other Presidential candidates from participation. 3 The equal time provision was
reinstated and despite pleas from Kennedy to suspend the provisions for the 1964
34. See id.
35. See id. at 66; see also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding the authority of
a regulatory agency to deny broadcast licenses).
36. See OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 349; Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 416
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1994)).
37. See POWE, supra note 2, at 66-67.
38. See OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 349.
39. See Communications Act of 1934 § I (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § I et seq.) (§ I
repealed 1947). Section I of the Act read, in part:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges .,. . there is hereby created a commission to be known as the
"Federal Communications Commission ......
Id. (emphasis added).
40. See id. § 315 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994)). Section 315 read:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public
office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, and the Commission shall
make rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect: Provided, That such licensee
shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate.
Id.
41. See id. § 315(a) (as amended by Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557).
42. See OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 367.
43. See id.
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Presidential Election,' Congress refused.
45
In 1975, the FCC, in its regulatory authority, interpreted the 1959 amendment
excepting newscasts from the equal time requirement to include the broadcasting
of political debates sponsored by non-broadcast organizations.46 In 1983, the FCC
further expanded this interpretation to include debates sponsored by the broadcast-
ers themselves.47
B. Modern First Amendment Holdings
1. Distinguishing the Standards For Public and Non-public Fora.
a. Widmar v. Vincent
The Court has determined that First Amendment protections of free speech
vary depending on the classification of the forum in which the speech is to be
propounded. Widmar v. Vincent 8 typifies the Court's interpretation of the First
Amendment's application to public fora. In Widmar, a student religious group
sued for access to the University of Missouri, Kansas City campus facilities for the
purpose of conducting meetings. 49  The group previously had access to the
facilities, but the University had changed its policy in order to conform to the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." The Court in Widmar concluded
that the University facilities were a public forum because the University "has
opened a forum for direct citizen involvement."'" Because it applied to a public
forum, the University's policy was subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny. 2
44. See S. Rep. No. 88-448 at 5-8 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2050,2054-57 (the letter
was from President Kennedy to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House).
45. See OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 367.
46. See id.; see also In re Aspen Inst., 55 F.C.C.2d 697 (1975) (the FCC interpretation was upheld
by Chisolm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
47. See OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 367; see also In re Henry Geller, 95 F.C.C.2d 1236 (1983) (the
FCC interpretation was upheld by League of Women Voters Educ. Fund v. FCC, No. 83-2194 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (listed in table at 731 F.2d 995)).
48. 454U.S.263(1981).
49. See id. at 265-66.
50. See id. at 265.
5I. See id. at 268 (quoting Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976)).
52. See id. at 269-70.
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Under the strict scrutiny standard the University "must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."53 The Court concluded that the University's interest in not
violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was not compelling
enough for it to abridge the students' freedoms under the free speech guarantees
of the First Amendment.54
b. Boos v. Barry
In Boos v. Barry,55 the Court again applied the public-forum standard to a
Washington, D.C. ordinance prohibiting the display of anti-foreign government
signs within 500 feet of that government's embassy.56 The Court found that
because the statute allowed pro-government speech, but not anti-government
speech, it was not content-neutral and therefore was subject to the strictest First
Amendment scrutiny." Under a First Amendment analysis, the Court found that
the city's interest in protecting foreign dignitaries from hateful speech was not
compelling enough to overcome the First Amendment right to freely express an
anti-government sentiment.58
c. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n
In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n,59 the Court held
that non-public fora are not subject to the same degree of protection under the First
Amendment as public fora.' The Court stated: "Public property which is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed by different
standards."'" "In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state may
reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long
as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."62
53. Id. at 270 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1980)).
54. See id. at 277-78.
55. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
56. See id. at 321.
57. Seeid. at318-19.
58. See id. at 329.
59. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
60. See id. at 46.
61. Id.
62. Id. This has become known as the viewpoint-neutrality test. See also infra notes 70, 75, and
accompanying text.
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d. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ,63 the Court
applied the non-public forum standard recognized in Perry.' The Cornelius Court
was faced with determining whether an executive order denying certain organiza-
tions access to solicit contributions during a federal employee charity drive violated
the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment.65 In deciding which forum
standard should apply,66 the Court noted: "We will not find that a public forum has
been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent .... nor will we infer
that the government intended to create a public forum when the nature of the
property is inconsistent with expressive activity."67 The Court also recognized that
the government can designate as public fora areas that would not traditionally be
considered public fora and then a First Amendment public-forum standard would
apply.68
However, in finding that the charity drive was, in fact, a non-public forum, the
Court recognized that the First Amendment is not nearly as protective of non-
public fora.69 "Access to a nonpublic forum ... can be restricted as long as the
restrictions are 'reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."' 7 In determining that the
government's justification for excluding certain groups from the charity drive was
reasonable,7 the Court held: "The reasonableness of the Government's restriction
of access to a nonpublic forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the
forum and all the surrounding circumstances. 7 -
e. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,73 the Court again
elucidated its standards for non-public fora.74 Recognizing that an airport terminal
63. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
64. See id. at 801-04.
65. See id. at 797.
66. See id. at 802.
67. Id. at 803.
68. See id. at 800.
69. See id.
70. Id. (citation omitted); see also supram note 62 and accompanying text.
71. See id. at 809-10.
72. Id. at 810.
73. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
74. See id. at 678-79.
was neither a traditional public forum nor a designated public forum, the Court held
that any restriction on speech inside the airport terminal need only be reasonable
and not an effort to suppress the speaker's activity based upon his viewpoint.75
Restricting solicitation to prevent disruption of foot traffic was a reasonable
restriction in a non-public forum.76
2. The First Amendment Prohibition Against Standard less Time,
Place, and Manner Restrictions Due to the Danger of Viewpoint
Discrimination
a. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.
In Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,77 the Court overturned a
municipal ordinance allowing the mayor discretion to issue permits as to when and
where news racks could be placed on public sidewalks." In Lakewood, the Court
was concerned with the lack of clear standards in the statute to guide the mayor in
approving or denying a permit.79 The Court noted that "without standards
governing the exercise of discretion, a government official may decide who may
speak and Who may not based upon the content of the speech or viewpoint of the
speaker."" The Court recognized that "even if the government may constitution-
ally impose content-neutral prohibitions on speech, it may not condition that speech
on obtaining a license ... from a government official in that official's boundless
discretion."'" The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would open the door for
a government official to use such a statute to prohibit speech based upon the
content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker.
8 12
75. See id. at 679" see also s.qpre note 62 and accompanying text.
76. See id. at 683-84.
77. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
78. See id. at 772.
79. See id. at 769.
80. See id. at 763-64 (emphasis added). The Court has never elucidated the difference between
permissible content-neutrality and permissible viewpoint-neutrality. From Per,". discussed supra, notes
56-62, one might reasonably conclude that a non-public forum restriction could satisfy the First
Amendment if it were content-specific but viewpoint-neutral. However, the Court has seemingly
combined the weight of viewpoint-neutrality and content-neutrality with its language in Lakewood. See
id.
81. Id. at 764.
82. See id. at 763-64.
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b. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham
Lakewood affirmed the rule of a prior Court decision, Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham,83 in which the defendant was convicted under a city ordinance for
participating in a civil rights protest march without a permit.' The ordinance
required that anyone participating in a march or parade secure a permit from a city
commission before doing so." The ordinance also gave the commission the
authority to deny the permit should it find that "the public welfare, peace, safety,
health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused." 6
Disregarding that the ordinance may have been aimed at secondary effects and
not the content of the speech itself, 7 the Court noted that, "we have consistently
condemned licensing systems which vest in an administrative official discretion to
grant or withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of
public places."88 The Court overturned the conviction because the ordinance was
too broad in the standards it prescribed for regulating a First Amendment right.89
c. Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement
In Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement,9" the Court again prohibited
an over-broad licensing statute.9 In this case, the licensing statute provided that
persons seeking a permit to publicly assemble were required to pay a fee to defray
the costs, such as crowd control and cleanup, incurred by the local government as
a result of the public assembly. 2 Discretion was given to the county administrator
to determine the amount of the fee for each application.9" While the Court found
that the fee was permissible under the First Amendment, the lack of clear standards
for determining the fee was not permissible.94 "A government regulation that
allows arbitrary application is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and
83. 394 U.S. 147(1969). Although Lcikewood is a more concise and more recent precedent, Justice
Stevens repeatedly cites to Shuttlesworth, hence its inclusion here. See intfra notes 219-27 and
accompanying text.
84. See id. at 148-49.
85. See id. at 149.
86. See id. at 149-50.
87. See id. at 152.
88. See id. at 153. (citations omitted).
89. See id.
90. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
91. See id. at 132-33.
92. See id. at 126-27.
93. See id. at 127.
94. See id. at 133.
manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means
of suppressing a particular point of view."9
In Forsyth County, the Court was especially concerned with the ordinance's
requirement that the nature of the assemblage determine the permit fee.96 In effect,
in order to determine what the assemblage would cost, the county administrator
would be required to examine the content of the speech.97 The Court rejected the
argument that examining the content of the speech to determine the cost of its
effect on the listening public is content-neutral.98 The Court stood firm to the rule
that, "[listeners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation."99
3. Private Citizens Have a First Amendment Right to Editorialize
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian And Bisexual Group of Boston,"°
the Court held that requiring organizers of a St. Patrick's Day Parade to include
groups with views the organizers disagreed with was a violation of the organizers'
First Amendment rights.'' The right of the press to editorialize also extends to
private citizens, and thus, the organizers, as private citizens, had a right to exclude
any group1 12 espousing a message with which they disagreed.0 3 A Massachusetts
law"° requiring the organizers to include the group had the effect of altering the
expressive content of their message, and therefore violated the organizer's First
Amendment rights.0 5
C. Balancing the First Amendment Rights of Broadcasters with
Congressional Intent to Provide a Fair Playing Field
1. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
One of the first important cases dealing with broadcasting and the effect of the
95. Id. at 130 (citations omitted); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
96. See id. at 133-34.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 134.
99. See id.
100. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
101. See id. at 559.
102. The organizers did not, however, have a right to exclude individuals from that group. See id.
at 572. "Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member of
GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has
approved to march." Id.
103. See id. at 573-74.
104. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 1998).
105. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
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First Amendment upon it was Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. " In Red Lion,
the FCC ruling that a Red Lion station had violated FCC rules by failing to provide
reply time to a person whose reputation was attacked on a broadcast was
challenged." 7 The Court upheld the FCC's ruling, holding that the FCC's
application of the "Fairness Doctrine", which requires broadcasters to provide
equal time to those wishing to express opposing viewpoints, was within the broad
scope of the powers granted to the FCC by Congress.' On the application of the
First Amendment to broadcasters, the Court noted:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
2. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee
In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,"' the Court was presented
with the question of whether Congress had granted the right to private licensees to
exercise editorial discretion in refusing to sell advertising time."' The Court, in
deciding that Congress had intended to grant such a right to private licensees, noted
that while it is not the Court's duty to defer to the judgment of Congress in
determining whether a regulatory scheme comports with the First Amendment, 
-
"
2
the Court, in evaluating First Amendment claims, must nevertheless afford great
weight to the decisions of Congress and FCC."' This is due to the dynamic nature
of broadcasting in which decisions regarding access to broadcasting, which were
adequate in the past, can become quickly outdated." 4
The Court also noted that Congress, when drafting the predecessor legislation
106. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
107. See id. at 372.
108. See id. at 391. The Fairness Doctrine was an FCC regulation requiring that opposing
viewpoints get equal airtime. The Fairness Doctrine was severely limited by the D.C. Circuit in
Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (1987), and the FCC subsequently repealed it. Congress has
made no attempt to reestablish the Fairness Doctrine by codifying it. See also OVERBECK, supra note
5. at 371.
109. Red Lion, 397 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
110. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
III. See id. at 97.
112. See id. at 103.
113. See id. at 102.
114. See id.
639
to 47 U.S.C. § 315,' 5 had affirmatively intended that private licensees not be held
under a duty to open the airwaves to all who wished to present a viewpoint." 6 At
the same time, Congress imposed a duty on private licensees to present differing
viewpoints in a balanced manner." 7 Such a duty was, in fact, inherent in the
language of 47 U.S.C. § 315, but could be exercised within the bounds of the
private licensee's editorial discretion.' 8 Whether such editorial authority vested
in public broadcasters was not addressed.
3. CBS, Inc. v. FCC
In CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 9 the Court decided that the FCC had broad authority to
punish a broadcaster who failed to perform his duty of providing reasonable access
to the airwaves to candidates for Federal office. ' ° Paramount in deciding this
question was the Court's determination of whether Congress had imposed a duty
on broadcasters to provide such access that superseded broadcasters' editorial
discretion.' 2' The Court found, in fact, that Congress had imposed such an
additional duty outside of the equal opportunity requirement of 47 U.S.C. § 315.122
This duty, enacted in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and codified
as 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)'23 allowed the FCC to revoke a broadcaster's license "for
willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of
reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally
qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy."'' 24 The
Court noted that the language of 47 U.S.C. § 315 was modified to accommodate
the duty under 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7). 25 Thus, Congress had evinced an intent to
115. See Radio Act of 1927. ch. 169. 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed by Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 416 (1934)); see also supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
116. See CBS, hic v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. at 117 (noting: "[Section 3(h) of the
Communications A t of 1934] stands as a firm congressional statement that broadcast licensees are not
to be treated as common carriers, obliged to accept whatever is tendered by members of the public.
Both these provisions [sections 3(h) and 3261 clearly manifest the intention of Congress to maintain a
substantial measure of journalistic independence for the broadcast licensee.").
117. See id. at I10- 1.
118. See id. at 109-I1. "Other provisions of the 1934 Act also evince a legislative desire to preserve
values of private journalism under a regulatory scheme which would insure fulfillment of certain public
obligations." Id. at I 11. The Court then cited to enumerated licensing duties and the Fairness Doctrine
as examples of these public duties. See id.
119. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
120. See id. at 390.
121. See id. at 396-97.
122. See id. at 385-86.
123. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994).
124. See id.
125. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 381: see also 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994). The amendment
to 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) changed it to read in pertinent part: "'No obligation is imposed under this
subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate...- thus recognizing
the new duty that was, in fact, imposed under section 312(a)(7) (emphasis added). See id. §§ 312(a)(7).
3 15(a).
640
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impose a duty on broadcasters to provide access for federal candidates that was
greater than the broadcaster's duty under 47 U.S.C. § 315 to serve the public
interest. 126
4. FCC v. League of Women Voters of California
In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,127 the Court was faced with
the question of whether the First Amendment permitted Congress to ban
editorializing on any station, publicly or privately owned, that received money from
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.' 8 In deciding that such a ban was
impermissible,129 the Court held that the First Amendment right to editorialize
superseded Congress' intent to keep these stations from becoming mouthpieces of
the government. 3 ° The Court, in a footnote,"' refused to extend such a right to
editorialize to publicly owned broadcast stations stating: "Whether a prohibition
on editorializing restricted to the licensees of state and local governmental entities
would pass constitutional muster is a question we need not decide."'
' 12
I
5. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,33 the Court was faced with the
question of whether the FCC's must-carry provision violated the First
Amendment.' 4 The must-carry provision,'35 enacted by Congress, required that
local cable providers provide enough channels on which all local broadcast stations
could be carried.'36 In determining that such a provision did not violate the First
Amendment,3 7 the Court held that in examining a content-neutral restriction on
speech, a less rigorous First Amendment analysis would be employed.'38 A
content-neutral restriction would pass First Amendment muster if 1) the restriction
achieved "a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less
126. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC. 453 U.S. at 385-86.
127. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
128. See id. at 366.
129. See id. at 402.
130. See id. at 395.
131. See id. at 394-95 n.24.
132. Id.
133. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
134. See id. at 626-27.
135. See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (1994).
136. See id. § 534(b); see also Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 630-32.
137. See Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 661-62.
138. See id.
effectively absent the regulation", and 2) such a restriction does not "burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests." 1'9
These cases illustrate a diverse range of concerns that the Court has addressed
in examining restrictions on free speech and the broadcast media, both in the
context of the First Amendment and the intent of Congress.
III. FACTS OF FORBES
In 1992, Petitioner, the Arkansas Educational Television Committee
("AETC"), decided to organize and broadcast political debates for each of the five
Federal legislative seats being contested in that year's elections. 4 ' AETC is a state
agency run by a board of eight appointed Commissioners who oversee a network
of five noncommercial stations running programming for the Public Broadcasting
System ("PBS").' 4'
The AETC invited only the Republican and Democratic candidates running for
the Arkansas Congressional third district seat to participate in its televised
debate. 4 2 The invitations were extended in June of 1992, approximately four
months before the October 22 debate. 4 3 In August of 1992, Respondent Ralph
Forbes received the 2000 signatures necessary to qualify for the third congressional
district ballot.'" He subsequently wrote to AETC asking to be included in the
October debate. 14
Forbes had lost several prior Arkansas elections and was considered to be a
marginal candidate in the third district race with little popularity.'46 Per a prior
decision only to allow major party and popular candidates, AETC turned down
Forbes' request to be included in the debates.'47 AETC premised its denial on the
assertion that their decision was the result of having "'made a bona fide journalistic
judgement that our viewers would be best served by limiting the debate,' to the
candidates already invited.""'
Three days prior to the debate, Forbes filed a lawsuit against AETC.'49 His
complaint was premised on violations of both the First Amendment and 47 U.S.C.
§ 315.1-5 47 U.S.C. § 315 is popularly known as the "equal opportunity
139. Id. at 662 (citation omitted).
140. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1637,
141. See id.
142. See id. at 1637.
143. See id. at 1637-38.
144. See id. at 1638.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
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doctrine."'' The equal opportunity doctrine requires that television stations
provide equal air time to political candidates under specified circumstances.
5 2
In his complaint, Forbes requested injunctive relief and declaratory relief, i.e,
to be included in the debate.'53 He also requested monetary damages.' 4 The
district court not only refused to grant the injunctive relief but also dismissed the
case for failure to state a claim.'"' The Eighth Circuit, on appeal, affirmed both the
denial of the injunctive relief and the dismissal of the 47 U.S.C. § 315 claim.56
However, in an en banc opinion, the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the
First Amendment claim.' 7 The court reasoned that because AETC is a state
agency, AETC must have a legitimate First Amendment reason to exclude Forbes
that overcomes his qualified fight of access to the debate forum. 8 The case was
remanded. 9
On remand, the district court applied the test of whether the forum fell under
one of the categories of public fora, or was a non-public forum."W The court
determined that the debate was a non-public forum.'6 ' The court then turned to the
issue of why Forbes was excluded and determined that the exclusion was due to a
legitimate non-viewpoint based reason. 6 2 Namely, Forbes did not have an
organized campaign, had little voter support, and was regarded as having no shot
by the local media.' 63 The district court found in favor of AETC.'4
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit again reversed. 6 The court noted that the
criteria of non-public forum eligibility were not valid here because the First
Amendment created a presumptive right of access to the forum.'66 "[T]he court
determined that the AETC's assessment of Forbes' 'political viability' was neither
a 'compelling nor [a] narrowly tailored' reason for excluding him from the
debate."1
67
151. See OVERBECK, supra note 5, at 369-71.
152. See id. at 371; see also 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
153. See Forbes. 118 S. Ct. at 1638.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id. (citation omitted).
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The United States Supreme Court granted the AETC's writ of certiorari.'68
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which five Justices
joined.'69 Justice Kennedy began by examining whether the Eight Circuit's public
forum analysis was necessary. 7 He concluded that normally, television does not
fall under a traditional public forum analysis. "[B]road rights of access for outside
speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the discretion that stations and
their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory
obligations."'
7
'1
Justice Kennedy reasoned that Congress had rejected the idea that television
was a traditional public forum in crafting legislation, citing language in CBS, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, 72 in which Congress specifically rejected
common carrier status for broadcasters. 73 He also noted that when broadcasters
chose to include or exclude someone from their airwaves, this action was a form
of editorializing protected by the First Amendment. 171
Justice Kennedy then noted that political debates were an exception to this
general rule. 7' He gave two reasons for such an exception. 76 One, that the ideas
produced at the debates were clearly the opinions of the candidates, and were not
the editorial views of the broadcaster. 177 Justice Kennedy's second justification for
the exception centered around the importance of political speech and the pervasive
reliance on television by the public in gathering information about candidates.'
Justice Kennedy's recognition of the political debates exception afforded in
the Court's previous First Amendment rulings is astute, but failed to recognize that
Congress has afforded political speech the same exceptional status. While, as
Justice Kennedy pointed out, Congress specifically intended not to make
broadcasters common carriers, Congress simultaneously made quite a few attempts
168. See id.
169. See id. at 1637 (joining the opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Breyer,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thornas).
170. See id. at 1639.
171. Id.
172. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
173. See id. at 110-I I; Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1639; see also sitpra notes 110-18 and accompanying
text.
174. See Forbes. 118 S. Ct. at 1639.
175. See id. at 1640; see also supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
176. See Forbes. I 18 S. Ct. at 1640.
177. See id.
178. See id. (citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)).
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to carve out exceptions to this rule, specifically for political debates.'79
47 U.S.C. § 315 specifically requires equal opportunities for access for federal
political candidates that are not afforded to the public at large. 80 Additionally, 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) allo'ws the FCC to revoke the license of any broadcaster who
fails to make reasonable attempts to grant access to all Federal election
candidates."" Both of these legislative acts tend to show a congressional intent to
exempt broadcasters from being able to exercise editorial discretion when it came
to political debates.
Justice Kennedy's analysis also failed to bolster the majority's argument that
Congress intended to allow broadcasters discretion to exclude marginal candidates
from debates.' 2 Specifically, Justice Kennedy did not address the Senate report
from the Federal Election Act of 1971 which presented evidence of a Congress
willing to allow broadcasters to exclude "fringe" candidates."' 3
Because of the recognized exception for public debates, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the Court was required to make a determination whether the AETC
political debate was a public or non-public forum."'4
Justice Kennedy began his public forum analysis by examining the classifica-
tions of fora under a First Amendment analysis: the traditional public forum, the
government designated public forum, and the non-public forum."'5 The Court did
not undertake a traditional public forum examination because the parties stipulated
that the debate was not a traditional public forum."' 6 Notwithstanding the
stipulation, Justice Kennedy recognized the fact that public forum analyses tend not
to look at the position of the parties or their determinations of how to classify the
179. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (discussing these exceptions).
180. See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
181. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)).
182. See S. Rep. No. 92-229 at 33 (1972), reprinted in 1971 WL 11292 at *33.
183. See id.
Because section 315 requires equal time for every candidate for an office, however
insignificant or frivolous his candidacy, the practical effect of the law has been to deny free
broadcast time to major candidates or to force free time to be shared with fringe candidates.
Therefore, we recommend the repeal of section 315(a) and its equal time requirements for all
candidates.
id.
184. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640-41. It is not clear why Justice Kennedy felt that he had to justify
performing a public forum analysis. The issue's First Amendment relevance was recognized by the
lower courts as well as the parties. See id. at 1638-39.
185. See id. at 164 1.
186. See id. at 1641-42.
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forum. 187
Citing to International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, ' Justice
Kennedy recognized the longstanding rule that the Court will not extend the label
of traditional public forum beyond its historic definitions.'89
Justice Kennedy then analyzed the debate to determine if it fell into the
category of a designated public forum."9 Citing to Widmar, he recognized that
"[t]o create a forum of this type, the government must intend to make the property
'generally available' . . . to a class of speakers."'' Citing to Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators Association,9 2 he recognized that when the
government grants general access to a class of speakers, it has created a designated
public forum. 9"' However, when the government reserves the right to be selective
in which persons from a class of speakers have access to a particular forum, it has
not created any type of public forum."
Justice Kennedy then reasoned that because AETC had not used an open-
microphone format but had used a scripted format with selected candidates, it had
not created general access to its debate.'95 Applying Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., he noted: "'Such selective access, unsup-
ported by evidence of a purposeful designation for public use, does not create a
public forum."" 96
However, Justice Kennedy's application of Cornelius to the facts of Forbes
is seemingly flawed in that it misinterprets how Cornelius applies to government
agencies. 17 Most notably, Justice Kennedy distinguished that if AETC had chosen
to go with an open microphone format for its debates, then this could be interpreted
that AETC was granting general access to its debates.'98 This narrow focus on the
187. See id. Thus, even though the University of Missouri in Widmnar v. Vincent contended that it
did not consider its facilities to be designated public fora, the Court observed that the University's
determination that the facilities' status was irrelevant in determining, under the First Amendment,
whether the facilities were considered a designated public forum. See stipra notes 48-54 and
accompanying text.
188. 505 U.S. 672 (1992), affd. 505 U.S. 830 (1992).
189. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641; Krishna Consciousness. 505 U.S. at 680-81; see also supra
notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing Krishna Consciousness).
190. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642.
191. td. (Citatioi omitted).
192. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
193. See Forbes, 18 S. Ct. at 1642.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 1643; see also supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (discussing Cornelius).
197. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 ("ITIhe Court has looked to the policy and practice of the
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and
debate as a public forum."). Seemingly, a local legislature's or administrator's intent not to create a
public forum would not override congressional intent to create a public forum. However, the Court
refused to address this exact question in Widnar v. Vincent by limiting its holding. See Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1981).
198. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642.
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intent of AETC alone completely ignores the intent of Congress.'" Again, 47
U.S.C. §§ 3152' and 312(a)(7), 20' both strongly indicate congressional intent to
designate a public forum by granting general access to Federal election candidates.
The language of both sections indicates a desire to make access available to the
entire class of Federal election candidates by non-selective, equal, and reasonable
criteria. ° 2  By applying Cornelius only to the lower state agency and not
considering Cornelius in the context of congressional intent,203 Justice Kennedy has
seemingly granted greater interpretive power to state and local legislatures than to
Congress for designating public fora.
Justice Kennedy then argued that requiring general access to broadcasting in
this way would restrict free speech, not promote it, because broadcasters would be
less inclined to hold such debates if they were required under the First Amendment
to invite every viable candidate. 2° As an example, he noted that when the court of
appeals reversed the district court's ruling in the lower court disposition of
Forbes,20 ' a Nebraska PBS station dropped its scheduled debate fearing that it
would be required to invite all of the qualified candidates. -°
However, Justice Kennedy's analysis failed to recognize the affirmative duty
that Congress already created in 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7), requiring broadcasters to
provide reasonable access to candidates for purposes such as a debate.0 7 Justice
Kennedy posited: "Were it faced with the prospect of cacophony, on the one hand,
and First Amendment liability, on the other, a public television broadcaster might
choose not to air candidates' views at all. '208 However, if a broadcaster were faced
with cacophony on one hand or losing its broadcast license on the other, it is hard
to imagine that broadcasters would not sprint headlong into the din, With a
positive duty to provide a free flow of political information as mandated by 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7), the danger of self-censorship seems slight.2'
Justice Kennedy next performed a non-public forum inquiry to decide whether
the exclusion of Forbes by AETC was for non-viewpoint related reasons. 2 0 Under
199. See supra notes 36-47, 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent with
reference to sections 315 and 31 2(a)(7)).
200. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
201. See id. § 312(a)(7).
202. See id. §§ 312(a)(7), 315; see also supra notes 40-44, 123-26 and accompanying text.
203. See id. §§ 312(a)(7), 315.
204. See Forbes. 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
205. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Telecomm. Network Found., 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996).
206. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
207. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7); see also supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
208. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
209. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7); see also supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
210. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643.
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the non-public forum standard, restrictions are permissible if they are not due to the
speaker's viewpoint and are reasonable in light of the purpose of the property. 2"
Examining the record, Justice Kennedy determined that there was substantial
evidence, including testimony from AETC employees, that Forbes exclusion was
due to his unpopularity among the electorate and not due to any disagreement with
Forbes' political views.
2 2
Justice Kennedy determined that a candidate's popularity and political viability
are viewpoint-neutral criteria for restricting speech. However, this seems to be in
direct conflict with the Court's earlier holdings in Forsyth County v. The
Nationalist Movement2 " and Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.' 4 The
popularity of a candidate and his viability are a direct result of the listeners'
reaction to his message. And as the Forsyth County decision noted: "Regulations
which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the
message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment."2 5 Lakewood affirmed
the prohibition: "[W]ithout standards governing the exercise of discretion,
government officials may decide who may speak and who may not based upon the
content of the speech or the viewpoint of the speaker. ' 2 6 The Forsyth County
decision was firm: "Listener's reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for
regulation." ' 7 In light of this, Forsyth County and Lakewood dictate that any
government regulation based upon listeners' reaction to the speaker's message can
never be considered content-neutral or viewpoint-neutral.'"
In his conclusion, Justice Kennedy reversed the ruling of the Eighth Circuit.'
19
B. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion joined by two justices."20 Justice
Stevens cited to Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham-- to support his argument that
AETC's failure to employ narrow, objective, and articulated standards in deciding
211. See id.; see also supra notes 59-76 and accompanying text (discussing non-public forum
analyses under PerrY, Cornelius, and Krisla Consciousness).
212. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643-44.
213. 505 U.S. 123 (1992); see also supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing Forsyth
County).
214. 486 U.S. 750 (1988): see also supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing
Lakewood).
215. Forsyth County. 505 U.S. at 135 (quoting Rogan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49).
216. L.itkewood, 486 U.S. at 763-64; see also sulpra note 80 (discussing viewpoint-neutrality).
217. Forsth Coitvty. 505 U.S. at 134.
218. See supra note 80 (discussing the Court's unwillingness to distinguish between viewpoint-
neutrality and content-neutrality in its holdings).
219. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
220. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg).
See id.
221. 394 U.S. 147(1969).
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who to invite to the debate created an unconstitutional presumption of corruptibility
in those administering the test.2 2 Examining the record, Justice Stevens pointed
out that AETC had decided not to invite Forbes two months before he had qualified
to appear on the ballot, premising their decision on his popularity. 23 According to
Justice Stevens, the lack of standards behind such a decision called into question
AETC staff members' reasoning.224 In its decision, AETC had neglected to
consider that Forbes had been popular enough among the electorate to force a
runoff election in a 1990 primary race.2 25 Such an inconsistent application of
AETC's standard less policy gave rise to the very presumption of viewpoint
discrimination that Shuttlesworth,226 Lakewood,227 and Forsyth County22' had
attempted to dissuade.2 9
The 1992 third district winner, in the election giving rise to the claim in
question, had won by only three percent of the vote. 30 Justice Stevens argued that
with such a narrow margin of victory, the inclusion of Forbes might have changed
the outcome of the election.2 1' He postulated that AETC's decision not to include
Forbes in the debate might have influenced the outcome of the election.-- -
Justice Stevens also pointed out that even though it was a public agency,
AETC was now seemingly subject to a lesser standard in justifying its decision to
exclude candidates from debates than privately owned television stations. -3 Under
222. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in Shuttlesworth).
223. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also noted that AETC had decided to
invite both the Republican and Democratic candidates in two other Arkansas districts to debate even
though it was clear that the Republican candidates in those districts had little popular support as well.
See id. at 1645 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This seems to indicate that AETC applied its unarticulated
"popularity" criteria subjectively depending on the candidate's party affiliation.
225. See id. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
227. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
228. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
229. See supra notes 77-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holdings in these cases
regarding the per se unconstitutionality of broad speech regulations because they give rise to viewpoint
discrimination).
230. See Forbes, I 18 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 1. See id.
232. See id. However, there is no indication from the Court's precedents that a broadcaster
influencing the outcome of an election would violate the First Amendment. At most, it might be a
violation of 47 U.S.C. § 315. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
233. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
If a comparable decision were made today by a privately owned network, it would be subject
to scrutiny under the Federal Election Campaign Act unless the network used 'pre-established
objective criteria to determine which candidates may participate in Ithel debate .... No such
criteria governed AETC's refusal to permit Forbes to participate in the debate.
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the Federal Election Campaign Act, 234 privately-owned stations had to elucidate
standards for denying a candidate access to a debate. 235 But, according to Justice
Stevens, the lesser standard applied to AETC gave it a subjectiveness in its
editorial decisions that was antithetical to the free speech protections of the First
Amendment.23 6 Justice Stevens also pointed out that the same criteria used to
exclude Forbes were not used by AETC to exclude candidates in other debates who
belonged to major parties.237 Justice Kennedy stated that this lack of uniformity in
the application of AETC's own policy provided "no secure basis for the exercise
of governmental power consistent with the First Amendment.
238
Justice Stevens also argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment, publicly
owned television stations were required to grant more access to members of the
public than privately owned television stations 23 9 "AETC staff members therefore
'were not ordinary journalists: they were employees of the government. "24 Citing
to CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,24' Justice Stevens supported the
idea that private stations had a right to editorialize that public stations, like those
run by the AETC, did not.24
2
Justice Stevens' argument is supported by the Court's decision in FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California.43 He is also supported by 47 U.S.C. §
396.4 In section 396, Congress specifically set out the reasons for establishing the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Among these reasons Congress declared that
"it is in the public interest to encourage the development of programming that
involves creative risks and that addresses the needs of unserved and underserved
audiences .... 245 Congress further stated that "it is necessary and appropriate for
the Federal Government to complement, assist, and support a national policy that
will most effectively make public telecommunications services available to all
td. (citations omitted).
234. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
235. See II C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (1997).
236. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting): see also supra note 224.
238. See Forbes. 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Forbes v. Arkansas Educ.
Telecomm. Network Found., 93 F.3d 497, 505 (8th Cir. 1996)).
239. See id. at 1645-46 (quoting Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network
Found., 22 F.3d 1423, 1428 (8th Cir. 1994)).
240. /d. at 1646.
241. 412U.S. 94(1973).
242. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Because AETC is owned by the State.
deference to its interest in making ad hoc decisions about the political content of its programs
necessarily increases the risk of government censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of
privately owned broadcasters does not.").
243. 468 U.S. 364,402 (1984) (in striking down a bill banning editorializing on any station, publicly
or privately owned, which received federal funding, the Court limited its decision: "We do not hold that
the Congress or the FCC is without power to regulate the content, timing, or character of speech by
oonconmercial educational broadcasting stations.") (emphasis added).
244. See 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1994).
245. Id. (emphasis added).
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citizens of the United States ....246 Such language indicates that Congress
intended for public broadcasters to have a higher duty to provide access than that
of private broadcasters.247
Justice Stevens then applied the Forsyth County v. The Nationalist
Movement 45 decision to Forbes.249 Justice Stevens argued that the unguided,
unarticulated standards that AETC used to exclude Forbes were analogous to the
standards found unconstitutional in Forsyth County."' "Perhaps the discretion of
the AETC staff in controlling access to the 1992 candidate debates was not quite
as unbridled as that of the Forsyth County administrator. Nevertheless, it was
surely broad enough to raise the concerns that controlled our decision in that
case."
251
Justice Stevens concluded by distinguishing that his opinion did not
necessarily support the notion that all candidates who qualified for the ballot
should be given access to debates, but rather that the unarticulated and broad
standards being afforded to AETC in making its decision did not comport with
First Amendment free speech principles.252
V. IMPACT OF THE FORBES DECISION
A. Judicial Impact
1. Validating Candidate Popularity as Valid Content-Neutral Criteria
Immediately, the effect of Forbes is clear: it makes political viability and
popularity of a candidate a constitutionally permissible criterion for excluding that
candidate. 253 Forbes recognized the viability of a candidate as being a permissible
246. Id.
247. It should be noted that 47 U.S.C. § 315 imposes a duty on private broadcasters greater than that
recognized by the majority for them in Forbes. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994); see also supra notes 39-47
and accompanying text (discussing § 315).
248. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
249. See Forbes, 1] 8 S. Ct. 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. See id.; see also supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Forsyth
County).
25 1. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 1649-50.
253. See id. at 1643-44.
content-neutral determination .2" This directly conflicts with the Court's earlier
holdings in Forsyth County and Lakewood that listener reaction can never be
content-neutral. 255 The impact that this conclusion will have is to allow lower
courts to give a broader definition of what type of restrictions are permissible under
the First Amendment as content-neutral.
2. The Prohibition on Standard less Time, Place, and Manner
Restrictions Applies Only to Public Fora
In previous rulings, such as Lakewood256 and Forsyth County,57 the Court
never addressed the issue of whether the First Amendment prohibition on standard
less time, place, and manner restrictions extended to non-public fora issues. Both
Lakewood and Forsyth County dealt with traditional public fora. 5 s In Forbes, the
AETC guidelines, although vague at best, could be defined under the Court's
language to fall into the category of a restriction on time, place, or manner.259
Thus, the Forbes Court was considering the application of time, place, or manner
restrictions on a non-public forum. The Court's affirmation of the standard less
AETC restrictions as reasonable should suggest to lower courts that the prohibition
against standard less restrictions, as stated in Forsyth County, should not extend to
non-public fora. 6'
3. Extending the Right to Editorialize to Publicly-owned
Television Stations
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian And Bisexual Group of Boston,26'
the Court balanced two speech rights: the right of a private citizen to control the
content of his speech (i.e., to editorialize) versus the right of under represented
groups to have access to fora. -62 The Hurley Court decided that the right to
254. See supra note 80. Assuming that content-neutrality and viewpoint-neutrality are subject to the
same First Amendment restrictions per the Lakewood decision.
255. See supra notes 77-82, 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holdings in
Forsyth County and Lakewood).
256. 486 U.S. 750 (1988); see also supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing
Lakewood).
257. 505 U.S. 123 (1992); see also supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing Forsyth
County).
258. See supra notes 77-82, 90-99 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings in Forsyth
County and Lakewood).
259. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1644 ("To be consistent with the First Amendment, the exclusion
of a speaker from a nonpublic forum ... must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the
property.") (citation omitted); see also supra note 63 (discussing time, place, and manner restrictions).
260. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Forsyth County prohibition
against standardless speech restrictions).
261. 515 U.S. 557 (1995); see also supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's holding in Hurley).
262. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573-74.
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editorialize could not be superseded by legislative mandate to accommodate other
groups' messages.263 Thus, Hurley elevated the right to editorialize to a greater
prominence than prior Court decisions had.M
The Forbes Court acknowledged that their decision represented a bow to the
discretion ofjournalists to editorialize, even journalists working at state-run, state-
funded public television stations. 26 5 Lower courts can interpret Forbes as an
extension of Hurley, elevating the First Amendment right to control one's speech
to a level equaling, if not superseding, the First Amendment right to access to
speech fora.266
B. Legislative Impact
The legislative impact of Forbes is that it could strike a severe blow to the
balance of power in the federal system. The Court has acknowledged in past
rulings that non-traditional public fora may be designated public fora by the
government. 267 However, these rulings have not set forth the threshold by which
courts would measure whether a government has acted to affirmatively establish
a designated public forum.
As discussed previously, there is a strong argument that Congress attempted
to make the public airwaves a designated public forum through the language in the
Communications Act of 1934.26' 47 U.S.C. §§ 1, 303, and 315269 all acknowledge
an intent to have licensees serve the public good.27° Additionally, even if the
airwaves of private licensees were not intended by Congress to be a designated
public forum, then the language of 47 U.S.C. § 396 nevertheless implies that the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting was established to regulate public television
263. Seeid. at581.
264. See infra note 274.
265. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1639.
266. The right to editorialize has now been extended to private citizens, public broadcasters, and
private broadcasters. For the case granting the right to editorialize to private broadcasters. See FCC
v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); see also supra notes 127-32 and
accompanying text (discussing League of Women Voters of California). See generally OVERBECK,
supra note 5, at 367.
267. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981); see also supra notes 48-54 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in Widmar).
268. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 39 (discussing the pertinent language in 47 U.S.C. § 1, since repealed). The
pertinent text in 47 U.S.C. § 303 allows the FCC to make regulations to "encourage the larger and more
effective use of radio in the public interest." See 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1994). The pertinent language
in 47 U.S.C. § 315 is discussed passim.
270. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent).
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in the context of a public forum. 271
If the above argument is a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent in
enacting these sections, then Congress can infer that its language in drafting these
sections did not cross the threshold necessary for it to establish a designated public
forum.
Although a radical consequence of Forbes, the aforementioned possible blow
to the balance of power in the federal system is an entirely reasonable interpretation
by lower courts that the Forbes decision entirely precludes Congress or other
legislative bodies from designating public fora.272
Another impact of the Forbes decision on Congress is that the Forbes decision
may persuade Congress not to attempt to revive the Public Broadcasting Amend-
ments Act of 1981.273 That Act banned editorializing by broadcast stations
receiving federal funds.274 The Court overturned the ban in FCC v. League of
Women Voters of California275 because it authorized an unconstitutional ban on the
editorial rights of privately owned stations.276 However, the Court in League of
Women Voters of California specifically reserved judgment concerning whether
such a ban would be permissible for public television stations.277
The Forbes decision seemingly illuminates the Court's position on that
undecided question. The Forbes decision clearly extends the right to editorialize
to public broadcasters.278 As a result, Congress is most likely to interpret the
Forbes decision as forbidding legislation which bans editorializing on publicly
owned television stations. 279
27 1. See supra notes 244-47 (discussing the enabling language of the CPB); see also 47 U.S.C. §
396 (1994).
272. This seems to be an unusual and unwarranted weakening of Congress' power by the Court and
likely is an unintended effect of the Forbes decision. Nonetheless, it is advanced here because it does
pose significant repercussions should the lower courts adopt such an interpretation.
273. See Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730 (1981).
274. See id. The pertinent part of the act amended 47 U.S.C. § 399 to read: "No noncommercial
educational broadcasting station which receive a grant from the Corporation [for Public Broadcasting]
under subpart C of this part may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial educational broadcasting
station may support or oppose any candidate for political office." See id.
275. 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984); see also supra note 274. Only the latter sentence from 47 U.S.C.
§ 399 in the previous note remains in the current statute. See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1994).
276. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
277. See League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. at 402; see also supra note 243 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's exact language in League of Women Voters of California).
278. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1640 (1998).
279. See id. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court's reasoning for striking down the
Public Broadcasting ban on editorializing, Stevens observed: "The Court noted that Congress had
considered and rejected a ban that would have applied only to stations operated by state or local
governmental entities, and reserved decision on the constitutionality of such a limited ban.")
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C. Social Impact
The social impact of the Forbes decision is subtle, but continues a trend which
seems not to be rooted in constitutional precedent, but rather in political precedent.
The Forbes decision seems to validate the sanctity of the two-party system.
280
Forbes allows any media broadcaster, either private or public, to justify its failure
to invite any third-party candidate to a political debate based upon that candidate's
viability.2 1 Yet, the current two-party system implies that third-party candidates
will always have questionable political viability because they are outside the two
parties controlling the system. Arguably, without exposure through the popular
media, and being able to be rightfully excluded from a debate with the two major
party candidates, a third-party candidate will never be able to achieve the same
media exposure as the major party candidates.282 Under 47 U.S.C. § 315, because
candidates in the same election must be able to purchase the same amount of ad
time at the same rate, third-party candidates would always have to spend more
money than their major party competitors in order to gain the same exposure that
those major party candidates received for free by competing in the televised
debate. 283 And the ability of political ads to affect the amount or kind of exposure
that a candidate wants as effectively as participation in a televised debate is
suspect.21 Such an outcome, requiring third-party candidates to outspend major
party candidates just to get the same television exposure seems to conflict with the
aims of Congress in both their passage of 47 U.S.C. § 315 as well as in their
280. See supra note 224. AETC's uneven application of its own popularity criteria when it came to
inviting major party candidates and the Court's failure to recognize this in its decision are a clear signal
that discriminating in favor of major party candidates is not unconstitutional.
281. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
282. See Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., Show the "Big Boys" That 3rd Parties Count, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
18 1996, at B9; William Bradley, '96 Debate for Two Is a Loss for Voters, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996,
at B9 (discussing the exclusion of third-party candidates from the 1996 Presidential debates and the
setbacks it posed to their campaigns); see also Tracy Wilkinson, Third Party Candidates Fight
Obscurity, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at A22 (discussing the exclusion of third-party candidates from
Senate seat debates). 1998 Minnesota Democratic gubernatorial candidate Hubert Humphrey I wanted
to include Reform Party candidate Jesse Ventura in televised debates because he felt it would work to
his opponent's disadvantage. See Christian Collet, Can thirdpartv candidates win ?, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 1998, at ECI. The performance of Ventura in those debates is touted as one of the
primary reasons Ventura triumphed over the major party candidates in that election. See id.
283. See generally Governor's Race, supra note 3, at B I; Gaughan, supra note 3, at B2.
284. See Governor's Race, supra note 3, at B I (the Virginia gubernatorial candidates in the 1997
election spent $2 million on campaign TV ads in one month).
passage of campaign finance legislation."8 5 Thus, without having access to the
same type of exposure as Republican and Democratic candidates for office, third-
party candidates will have to expend tremendous financial resources, more than
their major party counterparts, in order to be viable political candidates.
The two-party system is not rooted in Constitutional language, but is rooted in
the specific interpretations and modifications of parliamentary law by Congress
necessary to expedite its own functions.286 The Forbes decision is a step towards
keeping those parties who benefit from a two-party system in power.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, the Court held that
government-owned public television stations did not violate the First Amendment
by excluding third-party candidates who they determined to be unpopular. As a
result, the Court seemingly thwarted the intent of Congress in establishing and
funding public televison coverage of political debates in the first place. The Court
also gave a mandate to small agencies and local governments that: 1) they could
establish standard less criteria for restricting access to a forum so long as they had
a general policy of keeping those doors shut, and 2) they could decide whether or
not to designate a public forum irrespective of Congress' intent.
Ultimately, the Court has strengthened the hands of the inside players in a two-
party system even though this system has no basis in the Constitution. Third
parties will continue to be politically unviable so long as their candidates do not
have the same access and exposure as major party candidates. Forbes gives
government-owned public broadcasting stations--stations that are funded and
subject to the oversight of major party politicians in Congress-the right to continue
to keep third-party candidates from being viable political entities. As a result, the
threat third-party candidates pose to major-party candidates is substantially
reduced. On its face, this result seems to greatly conflict with the intent of the First
Amendment to promote free and open communication of ideas.
JOSHUA DALE
285. See supra notes 40-47, 199-203 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent with
regard to 47 U.S.C. § 315); see also Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (instituting fundraising limits and expressly provided funding to minor
party candidates in federal elections).
286. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 2 et seq.
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